The article offers a critical examination of 'borrowing' as a form of interdisciplinary engagement between psychology and history. This is where specific insights from one discipline are used (often selectively) by the other to shed light on a specific problem regarding experience, human motivation, or behaviour. Using two studies on the social psychological aspects of the Holocaust as relevant examples, the article highlights some of the epistemological and conceptual tensions implicit in this form of interdisciplinarity. These include the role of narrative and emplotment in historical reconstruction, the relationship between texts and historical context, the role of discourse and interpretation, and the tension between universalism and particularism.
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The Holocaust is undoubtedly the historical event which has had the single most profound influence on social psychology. Not only were a number of seminal studies directly driven by questions posed by the dark legacy of Nazism - Adorno et al.'s (1950) work on the authoritarian personality, Milgram's (1963 Milgram's ( , 1974 experiments on obedience, Oliner and Oliner's (1988) study of altruistic personality are some relevant examples -but more generally, the inevitable question of why the Holocaust happened has traditionally invited explanations which are psychological in nature. Across the social sciences and humanities, accounts of the Holocaust invariably touched upon the questions of individual and collective beliefs, social influence, personality, the power of the situation, emotions, prejudice, aggression, etc.
As a result, psychology -in the broadest sense -has been seen as potentially relevant to Holocaust scholarship, while the suffering of European Jews remained a regular motif in psychological literature on topics related to peace and conflict, and the question of why people do harm to others. On the other hand, the widespread acknowledgment of psychology's relevance to Holocaust studies has been offset by the recognition that, on its own, psychology could only take one so far. This is especially the case with the (over) confident approach of the likes of Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson & Sanford (1950) or Milgram (1963) whose quest for psychological mechanisms underpinning authoritarians and obedience tended to neglect the importance of broader socio-historical factors to which historical scholarship has been much more sensitive.
All this points to the possibility that psychology and history might be productively brought together to shed light on the Holocaust as a historical event. And SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 4 yet, the necessary interdisciplinary engagement has so far been marred by longstanding epistemological and theoretical tensions between the two areas of enquiry, and a climate of mutual suspicion. As Kenneth Gergen (2001, p.82) observed, psychologists regularly 'scan accounts of earlier times', but they do so mainly in the quest for 'interesting hypotheses and anecdotes', or for confirmation that the results of systematic and controlled empirical research have a wider currency and the much coveted ecological validity. But they seldom see psychology and history as truly complementary. Along similar lines, Billig (2008, p.10) notes that history is for many psychologists an incomplete enquiry, because of the evasive 'messiness' of history and social life: as history is concerned with past events, it leaves no scope for hypotheses, experimental controls or the manipulation of variables. Therefore, its claims 'can never be "proved" to the rigorous standards demanded by an experimental scientist'.
Among historians there is an equally widespread misgiving towards historical enquiry that appears to be overly reliant on psychological theories and empirical findings (see for example, Tileagă & Byford, 2014a , also Elms, 1994 and Nicholas, 2004 . Historiography of the Holocaust offers an illustrative example. When Christopher Browning (1992) , one of today's pre-eminent Holocaust historians, drew on Stanley Milgram's research on obedience to highlight certain aspects of the conduct of German reservists who participated in the murder of Polish Jewry, he was promptly accused by a fellow historian, Daniel Goldhagen (1997, p.391) , of offering an 'ahistorical explanation', one that has been 'conceived in a social psychological laboratory'. The author of Hitler's Willing Executioners exhibited little understanding for Browning's devotion to 'multi-causal interpretations based on multidisciplinary scholarship' (Browning, 2002a, p. viii) . At the core of Goldhagen's critique was the SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 5 assumption that psychology's universalist claims cannot account for the essential 'Germanness' of the Holocaust and 'the historic specificity of perpetrators […] and of a society that nurtured them' (Goldhagen, 1997, p. 94) . This distrust of psychology also reflects another concern, namely that psychology, by purporting to explain the actions of perpetrators (especially by highlighting their 'ordinariness'), goes some way towards exonerating their actions (see also Billig, 2002; Miller, Buddie & Kretschmar, 2002) . But, as Tindale, Munier, Wasserman and Smith (2002) have noted, even Goldhagen's supposedly non-psychological thesis, invokes both terminology and explanations that are essentially psychological. This points to the unavoidability of the contact between the two disciplines when it comes to accounting for human behaviour and motivation, but also illustrates the widespread reluctance to admit that this is so.
The 'Willing Executioners/Ordinary Men' debate highlights also an important aspect of historical research which alienates psychologists. Christopher Browning's and Daniel Goldhagen's diametrically opposed views were derived from the exploration of identical material -post war testimonies which members of the German army's 101 st Reserve Battalion made before judicial investigators. As Browning openly acknowledges, 'different historians reading the same set of interrogations would not produce or agree upon an identical set of "facts" -beyond an elementary minimum -out of which a narrative of events […] could be created' (in Goldhagen, Browning & Wieseltier, 1996, p. 21) . Thus, the same historical material can produce multiple, competing interpretations and explanations, and there are no means of adjudicating between them, beyond the good old-fashioned scholarly debate (see Billig, 1988) . There is no fool-proof, 'objective' way or testing empirically the relative contribution of, for example, 'eliminationist anti-Semitism culturally SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 6 imprinted over centuries' or 'institutional, organisational and situational factors' (Browning, 2002b, p. 5) .
In spite of these obstacles to interdisciplinary dialogue, psychologists and historians do engage with each other's work (see Tileagă & Byford, 2014a) . In this article, we will focus on one form of engagement which is especially prominent in social psychological accounts of the Holocaust. It is what Jordanova (2006) , called borrowing or transfer. This is where specific insights from one discipline are used (often selectively) by the other to shed light on a specific problem regarding human motivation, behaviour, and so on. When psychologists engage in borrowing from history (and historians), this usually involves selecting an account of a historical event, and then examining it through the prism of psychological research often with the, even if only implicit purpose of validating it or demonstrating its wider relevance.
When historians 'borrow', they take on the role of the 'seeker' who is 'poking about' psychological literature in the quest for 'some formula, some hypothesis, some model, some method which has immediate relevance to one's own work, and which seems to help one to understand one's data better and to arrange and interpret them in a more meaningful way' (Stone, 1987, p. 20) .
In what follows we offer a critical examination of borrowing as a form of interdsciplinarity, through the analysis of two specific Holocaust-related studies. The first is the exploration of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews as an instance of bystander intervention, by Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins and Levine (2006 And yet, we argue that the two studies warrant examination side by side. This is, first, because both are explicitly set up (and are, indeed, seen by others) as social psychological analyses of historical material and therefore as important attempts at interdisciplinary crossover. Second, they are illustrative of the two different faces of borrowing outlined above: Reicher et al. (2006) treat an episode from history as the testing ground for laboratory-based empirical findings, while Neitzel and Welzer (2012) approach psychology as a necessary resource for the interpretation of a unique kind of archival material. Third, both studies recognise the role of textual analysis of written or oral communication in psychological research; they engage explicitly with archival material to examine issues such as persuasion and identity construction (Reicher et al., 2006) Experimental research has shown that bystanders are more likely to intervene in a crisis situation if the person in need is perceived as a fellow member of a salient 'ingroup' (e.g. Levine, Prosser, Evans & Reicher, 2005) or when normative behaviour within the 'ingroup' includes an obligation to attend those in need regardless of group membership (see Hopkins, Harrison, Levine & Cassidy, 2004) . The Bulgarian case study is seen as extending this research by showing how social identity-related determinants of bystander intervention can be incorporated into efforts to mobilise potential helpers into collective action. Also, the divergent categorisation of Jews in relation to the national 'ingroup' and 'outgroup' is noted as an example of the rhetorical nature of categorisation which Steven Reicher in particular has highlighted in his work (e.g. Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) . Boundaries between groups (in this SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 10 case 'Bulgarians' and 'Jews') are seen neither as fixed in empirical reality nor as a function of cognitive and perceptual processes, but as situationally contingent rhetorical accomplishments which are produced in the argumentative context surrounding social mobilisation and the construction of national identity.
As well as being a study of the social identity aspects of bystander behaviour, Reicher et al.'s (2006) article is framed as an enquiry into a historical event, one that makes a direct contribution to Holocaust scholarship. By explaining the success of the mobilisation efforts in Bulgaria, a 'rhetorical social identity perspective' is said to offer a new angle in the study of rescue during the Holocaust, one which looks beyond the 'structural and political conditions of rescue' or the personality traits underpinning individual acts of altruism towards Jews (Reicher et al.,2006, p. 53) .
Since its publication, the study has been cited in numerous works on helping behaviour and group processes as a pertinent demonstration of the importance of social identity in the mobilisation of helping behaviour (e.g. Klein, Spears & Reicher, 2007; Levine, Cassidy& Jentzsch, 2010; Morton, Homsey & Postmes, 2009; Passini & Morselli, 2009; Rooyackers & Verkuyten, 2012; Thomas & McGarty, 2009) . What is more, the study's historical focus has been noted as its particularly valuable dimension, one that demonstrates that social identity model of helping operates in 'real life and not just in laboratory settings (Hopkins et al., 2007; Šubašić, Reynolds & Turner, 2008) . Thus, within this specific area of social psychological research, the story of the rescue of Bulgarian Jews is gradually becoming one of those illustrative examples which help connect 'the catalogues of experimental and empirical material with the world of the known', thus enabling psychologists to 'integrate psychological research with the social world' (Manning, Levine and Collins, 2007, p. 559) .
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In social psychological writing on bystander intervention, when attempts are made to take research into the 'real world'-whether in order to verify experimental findings or to generate new hypotheses -the spotlight tends to fall on those 'real life events' which are already seen, discussed and remembered in public discourse as intervention, an example of collective humanity and selflessness (see Arendt, 1970; Bejski, 1986; Boyadjieff, 1989; Goldhagen, 1997; Paunovski & Illel, 2000) . The notion of collective rescue is also entrenched in Bulgarian national memory, where it survives as a potent myth that reinforces positive national self-presentation. In the words of the Bulgarian anthropologist Ivaylo Ditchev, the idea of collective rescue has become, over the years, a powerful 'screen memory behind which a new national pride can be constructed in times of crisis' (cited in Secor, 2001, p. 34 the fierce debate, which raged for the duration of the communist era, between on the one hand regime historians who attributed the survival of Bulgaria's Jews to the activism of the country's workers' movement and its leadership, and on the other hand royalist circles in the diaspora who saw King Boris as the key figure in the rescue (see Oren, 1968; Todorov, 2001) . Since the end of the Cold War the focus shifted away from the involvement in the rescue of the communist party, although the relative contribution of the King, individuals from within the country's political establishment, the Bulgarian elite, or 'the Bulgarian people' as a whole are still widely debated.
Contested history of this kind presents a challenge for social psychologists. As was mentioned in the introduction, because much of social psychology focuses on behaviour in the present, psychologists can claim to have a direct and unmediated access to their object of study. In the context of experimental research in particular, psychologists are involved in the design and creation of the data they analyse. The only available and therefore authoritative description of 'events' and the conduct of the protagonists within an experimental situation is that supplied by the researcher who has direct access to 'what happened' (see Edwards, 1992) . Historians do not have that luxury: they deal with 'data' that, because its locus is in the past, is always imperfect, incomplete, contingent on interpretation, mediated through sources (Jordanova, 2006, p. 170) .
In an attempt to resolve the inconsistency between different historical interpretations, Reicher et al. (2006, p. 54 (Cohen & Assa, 1977) , through various encyclopaedic entries and relatively brief reflections on the rescue of Bulgaria's Jews (Arendt, 1970; Ben Yakov, 1990; Genov & Baeva, 2003) , to a number of lengthier and more comprehensive examinations of this topic (Bar-Zohar, 1998; Boyadjieff, 1989; Chary, 1972; Todorov, 2001 ) -deserve to be treated as equally credible. It also assumes that the extraction of the common denominator among the different versions eliminates 'bias' and renders the variability in historical interpretation immaterial.
While unusual in the context of historical scholarship, in a piece of psychological research this approach is perhaps less unexpected. The appeal to consensus is a common feature of what Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) refer to as 'empiricist repertoire' which permeates experimental psychology (see also Potter, 1996) . The empiricist repertoire paints a picture of a stable, empirically knowable, 'out-there', world. The task of the psychologist is to describe this world as a collection of agreements on knowable and uncontroversial 'facts'. The appeal to consensus is manifested, for example, in the emphasis on inter-rater, or inter-observer reliability, which, in the absence of more 'objective' criteria for establishing 'what is going on' in the context of a study, treats agreement as a marker of objectivity and positions a concurred upon version of events as unproblematic and value-free. Thus, Reicher et al. (2006) (2006) analyse in detail, had very little consequence: they were something that the Bulgarian king and his government had to live with, but it was not something that they necessarily took great notice of. This is because the pro-German government enjoyed widespread support from the Bulgarian public, largely due to the fact that through collaboration with Nazi Germany, it fulfilled the nationalist dream of territorial expansion in Dobrudja, Macedonia and Thrace (see also Oren, 1968) . Thus, for much of the war 'the philo-Semites in the opposition protested, but the government carried on its work' (Chary, 1972 , p. 191, see also Todorov, 2001 1998; Chary, 1972; Feingold, 1970; Oren, 1968; Todorov, 2001) . Therefore, the decisions about whether or not to deport Jews to the Nazi camps were the result of complex political calculations.
Moreover, if there is a single act of public protest that did influence the last minute decision to cancel the deportations, it was the petition to the Prime Minister which in previous years passed the antisemitic laws that provoked public opposition (Chary, 1972, p.189 1943 (Bar Zohar, 1998 Chary, 1972; Todorov, 2001 ).
This broader and more complex political dynamic behind the survival of Bulgarian Jews suggests that 'rescuers' were not a clearly identifiable category and source of political agency, distinct from (intended) victims or perpetrators (Chary, 1972) . This is an important point because the whole tradition of psychological research on bystander behaviour is predicated on the assumption that there is a triangle of clearly demarcated roles: the victim, the perpetrator and the bystander. In experimental research on bystander behaviour, including that which draws on social identity theory, the boundaries between the three categories are treated as fixed. In an experiment, the 'emergency situation' is set up, by design, as an interaction between the 'bystander' (the participant) and a person requiring help. The distribution of roles is unambiguous and the course of events carefully managed.
Beyond the laboratory, however, this division is not clear-cut. In fact, the debates about the 'rescue', which Reicher et al. (2006) Hilberg, 1993; Marrus, 1987; Niewyk & Nikosia, 2000) . Reicher et al. (2006) , by implying that the roles were distinct and mutually exclusive, fail to recognise the 'infinite gradations of moral responsibility' (Cohen, 2001, p.143) and the way in which rescue always involved 'a complex social configuration' (Andrieu, 2010, p. 506).
The fact that Reicher et al. (2006) course of social interaction (see also Billig, 1987 , Edwards, 1997 , Wetherell & Potter, 1992 instead is a more integrated approach, one that ensures two-directional traffic between psychology and history, and which, rather than seeking to tame the inherent 'messiness' of history, turns it into an object of enquiry. This is an issue that we will return to in the conclusion.
WAR AS WORK? RECONSTRUCTING THE MIND-SET OF THE WERMACHT SOLDIER
In much of the literature on the social psychological aspects of the Holocaust engagement with history tends to be confined to secondary sources (e.g. Baum,2008; Miller, 2004; Newman & Erber, 2001; Staub, 1996 Staub, , 2003 . Just like in the case of Reicher et al. (2006) , rather than delving into the archives and becoming engrossed in the complexities involved in the reconstruction of the past, writers have tended to rely on published accounts and used them as the basis of a psychological interpretation.
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The second example considered in this article takes a very different approach. feelings and behaviour of a group of people at a particular point in history.
In the years preceding the publication of Soldaten, Sönke Neitzel, the historian of the two authors, had published a small number of articles on the secret recordings (which he uncovered in 2001, shortly after they were declassified), as well as a book containing a selection of the transcripts (Nietzel, 2007) . However, as he reveals in the 'Prologue' to Soldaten, up until his collaboration with a psychologist he made only 'scant progress in evaluating and interpreting this source material' (Neitzel, 2012, p. viii) . The reason was not just the sheer quantity of the archival data (tens of thousands of pages of transcripts) but also its nature. To make sense of the recordings, it was necessary to go beyond the scope of a single discipline. As his co-author explains:
'as a social psychologist without a profound knowledge of the Wehrmacht, I
would never be able to interpret the material historically. Conversely, someone with a purely historical perspective would never be able to decode all the communicative and psychological aspects of the protocols […] Only by combining our disciplines, social psychology and history, would we be able to do justice to the material as a source for reconstructing a particular mentality SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 21 and arrive at a revised perspective on soldiers' behaviour' (Weltzer, 2012, p. ix) What made the material especially appealing to the authors is that it promised a unique insight into the mind, the 'mentality' of the German military. In the authors' view, the protocols were not yet another historical source, to be considered alongside documents, diaries and post-war testimonies in the attempt to shed light on the motives of those who killed and died for the Third Reich. According to Weltzer, sources that had been previously available to historians were inherently 'problematic'.
'Official investigations, letters from the field, eyewitness reports, and memoirs' share the same shortcoming: 'they were consciously composed and addressed to someone specific: a prosecutor, a wife at home or an audience the authors wanted to win over' (p. ix). The secret recordings, referred to as the 'protocols', on the other hand, appeared devoid of an 'agenda': 'men were talking live, in real time about the war and their attitudes towards it' (p.ix). In the surveillance protocols 'the speakers do not address their statements to any external moral arena' (Neitzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 150) . This is routine talk, in 'real time' (a phrase frequently used to describe the data), among people who inhabit the 'one and the same world' (p.4). Captured on tape and later transcribed, these conversations are believed to cut through the uncertainties inherent in conventional historical sources, and offer a glimpse into the perpetrators' inner world and 'the relationship between individuals and their actions' (p.6).
The protocols, however, do not speak for themselves: their understanding, the authors argue, requires an explanatory framework (in this case, a psychological one)
that can elucidate what 'goes on' in Wehrmacht soldiers' minds. In the quest for this framework, and in providing a psychological insight into the conduct of German here?' (Nietzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 9) . Vaguely defined in this way, frames resemble both the traditional psychological notion of schema (Fiske & Linville, 1980) , and Moscovici's (1984) social representations. Like schemas they are said to provide cognitive efficiency: frames are shortcuts that 'save individual human beings a colossal amount of work' (Nietzel & Welzer, 2012, p. 9) ; like social representations they are inherently social, in that they draw on 'a corpus of cultural orientation and knowledge' (p.9). Also, frames are said to be hierarchically structured: they range from 'frames of the first order' that include 'the broader sociohistorical backdrop against which people in a given time operate', all the way down to those that function at the 'level of psychology' and include 'personal dispositions and individual decision making' (p.10).
And yet, throughout the book these 'frames of reference' remain vaguely defined, and there is no theoretical elaboration of what they are or how they operate psychologically. There is, similarly, no attempt to illuminate the interplay between different frames, or look at how the sociohistorical context might, for example, influence the individual psychological functioning of perpetrators, or vice versa. This SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 23 is surprising because the idea that individual beliefs, motivations and behaviour cannot be understood outside the micro and macro socio-political contexts is one that one finds in both in psychology and historiography (Browning, 1992) , and is therefore an obvious candidate topic for interdisciplinary scholarship. And yet, Neitzel and
Weltzer's (2012) book does not venture that far. We would like to suggest that this is a feature of interdisciplinary borrowing. Soldaten is first and foremost a work of historiography, and psychological insights are brought in, selectively, to buttress a specific historical argument. For this purpose, concepts borrowed from psychology needed to be made quite basic and straightforward; they needed to be diluted, and administered to the readership in manageable doses.
At the same time, engagement with psychology left an important mark on the book. Nietzel and Weltzer's (2012) most wide-ranging conclusion is that the situation in which soldiers had found themselves had a profound influence on their conduct and way of thinking: the demands of armed conflict and the immediate context of war affected their actions and 'mentality'. This is a leaf straight from the book of traditional, experimental social psychology, where interpretations of human behaviour had traditionally focused on the power of the situation -social roles, presence of authority, social influence, propaganda, etc.
The situationalism underpinning Nietzel and Weltzer's (2012) argument is especially apparent in the idea of 'war as work' which permeates the book and which overshadows any discussion of the 'frames of reference' which are specifically related to the historical context of the Holocaust, the broader military project of Nazi
Germany and the ideology of National Socialism, or indeed those that relate to 'personal disposition' of individual soldiers. The suggestion here is that war itself imposes a world view and pattern of behaviour (a 'frame of reference') that makes SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 24 violence possible, and in some sense inevitable. Soldiers, it is claimed, kill because 'fighting is their job' (pp.6, 339, 343) because violence and destruction are demanded by the 'customs of war' (p.75). The authors take this argument one step further to argue that ideology played a minor role in the conduct of the Wermacht soldiers, and that its effect is often overemphasised: 'ideology may provide reasons for war, but it does not explain why soldiers kill or commit war crimes ' (pp. 319-320) . Also, they argue that the same 'frame of reference of war', defines the conduct of soldiers in any war. It is therefore 'timeless' and universal (Nietzel, 2013, p.12) . War, according to Nietzel and Weltzer (2012) of war' is precisely one such 'greedy', universalising concept. Of course, we don't know if it was the engagement with psychology that led Nietzel and Weltzer (2012) to a universalist and situationalist conclusion, or whether their hunches about the importance of 'war as work' led them to seek confirmation in a psychological interpretation. Either way, the interdisciplinary engagement in evidence here bears the hallmarks of interdisciplinary borrowing.
In the case of Soldaten, however, the perils of borrowing are not apparent just in the way in which authors use the concept of 'frames of reference' to make sense of, and draw conclusions from, the protocols. They are also to be found in the treatment of the protocols themselves. As was already noted, the authors treat the archival material -which Sönke Neitzel (2012, p. vii) Gergen (1973, p.319) argued that psychology ought to be concerned with the 'systematic study of social history', while Moscovici (1987, p.514) called for psychology to become a form of 'anthropology of modern culture'. Implicit in both arguments is the still often ignored recognition that the human condition is socially and historically bounded and that psychology can benefit greatly from a closer engagement with other disciplines, including history. However, as we argued in this SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 27 article, for the collaboration between psychology and history to be productive, the engagement needs to overcome the perils inherent in the today all-too-common practice of interdisciplinary 'borrowing'.
Before we proceed to consider some of the broader issues raised in the article, it is important to note that our aim here is not to provide coherent and definitive recommendations about how to overcome the shortcomings of borrowing, or to propose a set of guidelines about how to 'do interdisciplinarity'. Interdisciplinarity, after all, is a dynamic, evolving and multifaceted process. Instead, we shall simply point out some broader themes and areas of concern brought to light by our exploration of 'borrowing', that could be seen as starting points for closer engagement between social psychology and history, First, a frequently noted tension between psychology and history lies in their different preoccupation with, and emphasis on, the universal and the particular. Some historians will argue convincingly that history is a discipline of the particular; that it is the story of a specific historical context, an account or interpretation of an event played out by actors in a particular time and place. Many psychologists, on the other hand, regard psychology as a discipline of the general and the universal, one that aspires to uncover generic laws of human behaviour that transcend specific historical conditions and the unique, context-dependent experience and behaviour of individuals. It might therefore be argued that interdisciplinarity is predicated on finding a way of doing history and psychology in a way that transcends this Put differently, the notion of 'bystander' is inherently historical, and as such it stands at the core, rather than outside, the purview of interdisciplinary analysis.
Equally, adding psychological texture to historical enquiry ought to push historians to reassess some of their own assumptions about the way in which psychological topics -mentalities, social representations, stereotypes, inner conflicts, memories, habits, and so on -precisely because they are inherently historical, can be made a central part of their investigations. The analysis in Soldaten should therefore have gone beyond superimposing the 'frame of reference' analytic framework on the data, and embraced a more reflexive approach to the protocols as a cultural artefact, recognising its interactional and situated dimensions, and considering the implications SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE STUDY OF THE HOLOCAUST 30 of this for psycho-historical analysis of the materials and conclusions that can be drawn from it.
All this is important also because borrowing, which is inherently selective, invites researchers to focus on historical examples, or psychological insights, which are most likely to confirm a predetermined interpretation. It is presumably comforting for psychologists to 'discover' that their theoretical hunches, models, theories have ecological validity, that the real world maps onto, or organizes itself in a way that is predicted by psychological theory. And yet, as we have seen, this can have the unintended consequence of limiting, rather than expanding, the range of questions that psychologists are asking about their object of study. It is similarly comforting for historians to 'discover' that their intuitions regarding people's motives can be clarified or corroborated by a piece of psychological research or conceptual
framework. Yet they need to be aware of psychology's own limitations when it comes to describing experience. The vocabulary of psychological sciences can lure the historian into a false sense of confidence about the depth and reach of his or her interpretations.
The main point here is that interdisciplinary analysis, if it is to transcend some of the problems of borrowing, needs to be transformative rather than confirmatory: its objective ought to be to reshape both psychological and historical ways of thinking, shifting each discipline's centre of gravity in the direction of closer engagement with each other. Interdisciplinarity, therefore, requires a level of conceptual reflexivity that will ensure that the human condition is recognised, at all times, as both psychological and historical (Tileagă & Byford, 2014b ). This will place, at the centre of the enquiry, the question about how historical conditions, ideologies and cultural traditions 
